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Delaware Department of Justice 
820 North French Street 
Carvel Office Building 
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OPINION∗∗ 
________________ 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
 Hans Scheing appeals the District Court’s order, dismissing his malicious 
prosecution claims against various Delaware Department of Natural Resources and 
Environmental Control (DNREC) employees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6).  Because Scheing has failed to state a claim for relief against any defendant, we 
will affirm.    
I.1 
Scheing installed septic tanks for Delaware Septic Service, LLC—a company 
owned by his wife.2  On July 22, 2013, Scheing entered into a contract with Frank and 
                                              
∗∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 The following facts are drawn from the Second Amended Complaint.  App. 15-25. 
2 Scheing’s wife, Tina Webb-Scheing, was a plaintiff in the District Court proceedings 
but only with respect to the loss-of-consortium claim.  Because the dismissal of that 
claim is not at issue on appeal, we refer only to Hans Scheing throughout this opinion.   
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Winifred Vadala, an elderly couple, to replace their failing septic system.  That same day, 
Scheing performed soil testing on the Vadalas’ property to determine the type of system 
to install.  As alleged, Scheing informed the Vadalas that he could not begin the 
installation until he received the soil-test results, which could take several months, and he 
subsequently provided them with periodic updates.  Fifty days later, on September 10, the 
Vadalas filed a complaint with DNREC alleging that Scheing did not perform any work 
to fix their septic tank—work that they had paid him to perform. 
According to Scheing, upon learning of the Vadalas’ complaint, several DNREC 
employees, David Schepens, Andrew Whitman, and Daniel Albanese, “brought” criminal 
charges against Scheing, sounding in theft and home-improvement fraud “to advance 
their careers” and “to benefit” Schepens’ son.3  The son owned a competing septic-
service company.  Schepens, Whitman, and Albanese then “directed” DNREC Officer 
Casey Fountain to investigate the Vadalas’ complaint.   
Fountain met with the Vadalas at their property in September to discuss their 
complaint against Scheing; the Vadalas informed Fountain that Scheing had performed 
soil testing but had taken no other actions to fix their septic tank.  Fountain called 
DNREC to inquire whether it had received a soil-test report for the Vadalas’ property; no 
report had been filed with DNREC at that time. 
Relying on this information, on October 14, Fountain sought and obtained a 
warrant to arrest Scheing for home-improvement fraud and theft.  Scheing asserts that 
                                              
3 App. 17-18, ¶¶ 13, 19.  
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Fountain omitted from the warrant application any reference to the soil test performed on 
the Vadalas’ property.4   
Scheing received the soil-test report from the expert on October 11.  On October 
16, the soil-test report was sent to DNREC for approval.  The report was time-stamped by 
DNREC on October 17. 
According to Scheing, on October 21, Fountain contacted Scheing and allegedly 
informed him that “he wanted to ‘talk about some contracts’” and that “he did not need a 
lawyer.”5  Fountain did not advise Scheing that he was under investigation.  At the police 
station, Fountain arrested Scheing.  Scheing claims that Fountain had been “directed” to 
do so by Schepens, Whitman, and Albanese, despite Scheing’s protestations of 
innocence.6  
 In November 2013, the Court of Common Pleas dismissed all criminal charges 
against Scheing.  The defendants nonetheless “sought a grand jury indictment,” which 
resulted in a Delaware grand jury indicting Scheing for theft and home-improvement 
fraud in January 2014.  The defendants’ role in procuring the indictment is unclear, but 
Scheing contends that information “concerning the soil testing . . . was purposefully 
omitted from the grand jury.” 7  In September 2014, the Court of Common Pleas again 
dismissed all charges against Scheing.  
                                              
4 The defendants attached a copy of the warrant application to their motion to dismiss, 
see App. 54-58, but we need not consider it because the Second Amended Complaint is 
deficient on its face.  See App. 7.  
5 App. 20, ¶ 32. 
6 App. 20, ¶¶ 33, 36.    
7 App. 22, ¶ 46.   
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 In November 2015, Scheing brought a civil action against DNREC and various 
individuals, seeking, among other things, relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for malicious 
prosecution, false arrest, and due process violations, and under state law for loss of 
consortium.  The defendants moved to dismiss, prompting Scheing to file an Amended 
Complaint with claims against only defendants Schepens, Whitman, Albanese, and 
Fountain.  The District Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the Amended 
Complaint because Scheing’s pleading failed to allege (i) the personal involvement of 
defendants Schepens, Whitman, and Albanese, and (ii) the absence of probable cause, as 
required to state a malicious prosecution claim against Fountain.  With leave, Scheing 
filed a substantively similar Second Amended Complaint in June 2016, maintaining only 
his claims for malicious prosecution while abandoning his false arrest and due process 
claims.  The defendants again moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and on 
qualified immunity grounds.  In November 2016, the District Court dismissed the Second 
Amended Complaint in its entirety for largely the same reasons it had dismissed the 
Amended Complaint.8  Scheing appeals. 
                                              
8 App. 15-23.  In so ruling, the District Court did not address the defendants’ alternative 
argument that they were entitled to qualified immunity.  
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II.9 
The District Court properly dismissed Scheing’s Second Amended Complaint 
under Rule 12(b)(6).  To state a viable claim for malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, a plaintiff must show that “(1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) 
the criminal proceeding ended in his favor; (3) the defendant initiated the proceeding 
without probable cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than 
bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty 
consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.”10  Vague 
allegations of wrongdoing leveled against all defendants do not suffice because a 
government official “is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”11  Thus, a plaintiff 
seeking relief under § 1983 must plausibly allege “with appropriate particularity” that 
each defendant was personally involved in the purportedly wrongful conduct.12  Such a 
                                              
 9 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal 
of Scheing’s Second Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).  See, e.g., In re Asbestos 
Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 822 F.3d 125, 131 (3d Cir. 2016).  In conducting our review, 
we must ignore all legal conclusions, accept all well-pled factual allegations, draw all 
reasonable inferences in Scheing’s favor, and then determine whether the Second 
Amended Complaint “states a plausible claim for relief.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
678-79 (2009); In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 822 F.3d at 131.   
10 Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 379 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Johnson v. Knorr, 477 
F.3d 75, 82 (3d Cir. 2007)).  
11 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677; see Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 222-23 
(3d Cir. 2015). 
12 Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988); Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 
222; see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.   
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showing can be made through sufficiently particular “allegations of personal direction or 
of actual knowledge and acquiescence.”13   
We conclude that Scheing has not stated a viable malicious prosecution claim 
against any defendant.14  Indeed, Scheing fails to adequately allege that defendants 
Schepens, Whitman, and Albanese were personally involved in the alleged violations of 
his constitutional rights or that defendant Fountain “influenced or participated” in the 
decision to initiate criminal proceedings or otherwise acted without probable cause.   
A.  
Despite two opportunities to re-plead his claims, Scheing fails to plead particular, 
non-conclusory allegations sufficient to establish the personal involvement of defendants 
Schepens, Whitman, and Albanese.  Scheing merely alleges that they collectively 
(i) brought criminal charges against him upon learning that the Vadalas had filed a 
complaint, (ii) directed Fountain to investigate the complaint, (iii) directed Fountain to 
arrest Scheing after he obtained a warrant, (iv) sought a grand jury indictment, and 
(v) took these measures to advance their careers and benefit Schepens’ son.  These vague 
and conclusory allegations, which make no effort to differentiate the actions of each 
individual defendant from the actions of the group as a whole, simply “mimic[] the 
                                              
13 Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.  Scheing’s argument that the personal involvement 
requirement applies only at the summary judgment stage is belied by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Iqbal and our decision in Rode—both of which clarify that dismissal 
is warranted at the pleading stage absent an adequate showing of personal involvement.  
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Rode, 845 F.2d at 1197, 1207.  
14 Contrary to Scheing’s contention, the District Court did not subject his pleading to 
“an improperly heightened plausibility analysis, or, in the alternative, require[] a pleaded 
prima facie case.”  Op. Br. at 19.  The court applied the correct standard.  See App. 3-12.   
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purported legal standards for liability” and therefore need not be accepted as true for 
purposes of our analysis.15  Even if we consider these allegations, they are so devoid of 
particularity and “factual enhancement” that they do not permit us to infer that any of 
these defendants personally participated in the initiation of criminal proceedings against 
Scheing.16  Rule 8 “does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with 
nothing more than conclusions.”17   
B. 
 Scheing’s malicious prosecution claim against Fountain fares no better because 
Scheing has failed to establish the initiation of criminal proceedings and the absence of 
probable cause—the first and third elements of his cause of action.18    
First, Scheing has not adequately alleged, as he must, that Fountain initiated 
criminal proceedings against him.19  Unlike a prosecutor, an arresting police officer can 
be held liable for malicious prosecution only if the officer “influenced or participated in 
                                              
15 Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 643 F.3d 60, 74 (3d Cir. 2011); see, 
e.g., Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 132 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that 
“mere restatements of the elements of [a plaintiff’s] supervisory liability claims . . . are 
not entitled to the assumption of truth”). 
16 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (courts need not accept the truth of a complaint that tenders 
‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2009))); see App. 5, 9 n.5.   
17 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559.   
18 See Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
19 Although the District Court assumed Scheing had pled this element, “we may affirm 
a judgment on any ground apparent from the record, even if the district court did not 
reach it.”  Oss Nokalva, Inc. v. Eur. Space Agency, 617 F.3d 756, 761 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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the decision to institute criminal proceedings.”20  According to Scheing, Fountain’s 
involvement in his failed prosecution was limited to the investigation, the decision to 
seek an arrest warrant, and the subsequent arrest; such an involvement is very different 
from the decision to bring charges or seek indictment.21  Scheing has not alleged that 
Fountain was involved in, let alone influenced or participated in, the initial decision to 
bring charges against Scheing.  Because the reasonableness of Fountain’s arrest of 
Scheing is a wholly independent inquiry from the propriety of the separate decision to 
pursue criminal charges against him,22 Scheing’s failure to allege Fountain’s involvement 
in the latter process is fatal to his claim.  
Second, even if Scheing had sufficiently alleged that Fountain initiated criminal 
proceedings against him, he still has not established that Fountain did so without probable 
cause.  “Probable cause exists if there is a ‘fair probability’ that the person committed the 
crime at issue.”23  Probable cause “requires more than mere suspicion,” but does not 
require “evidence sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”24  Nor does it 
“require that officers correctly resolve conflicting evidence or that their determinations of 
                                              
20 Hasley v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 297 & n.22 (3d Cir. 2014); see Albright v. Oliver, 
510 U.S. 266, 279 n.5 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“The principal player in 
carrying out a prosecution . . . is not police officer but prosecutor.”). 
21 See Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 794 (3d Cir. 2000) (observing 
that determining whether a defendant had “probable cause to arrest” is an “independent 
inquiry” from whether there was “probable cause to pursue . . . prosecution”).   
22 See Merkle, 211 F.3d at 794.   
23 Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 467 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Wilson v. 
Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 789 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
24 See Zimmerman v. Corbett, 873 F.3d 414, 418 (3d Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted).  
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credibility, were, in retrospect, accurate.”25  Although not a toothless standard, it “is not a 
high bar” either.26    
The allegations in the Second Amended Complaint, accepted as true, establish that 
Fountain acted with probable cause.  In assessing probable cause, we must remain 
mindful of the fact that both a neutral, detached judicial officer and a grand jury 
separately determined that there was probable cause to believe that Scheing had 
committed a crime.  Indeed, the existence of a facially valid warrant renders an arrest 
objectively reasonable unless “it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would 
have concluded that a warrant should issue.”27  Scheing’s pleading does not satisfy that 
exacting standard.  Although Scheing attempts to rebut the presumption of probable 
cause by alleging that Fountain omitted material, exculpatory information relating to the 
soil testing from his affidavit,28 those alleged omissions do not negate the existence of 
probable cause because a magistrate could have viewed that allegedly exculpatory 
information and still concluded that there was a fair probability that Scheing was in the 
process of defrauding the Vadalas.29   
Moreover, in a malicious prosecution action, it is well-established that a “grand 
jury indictment . . . constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause to prosecute,” 
which will only be overcome “by evidence that the [indictment] was procured by fraud, 
                                              
25 Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 467 (quotations omitted).    
26 District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586 (2018) (quotations omitted).  
27 See, e.g., Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546-48 (2012). 
28 Andrews v. Scuilli, 853 F.3d 690, 697-99 (3d Cir. 2017).  
29 Cf. Zugehoer v. State, 980 A.2d 1007, 1011 (Del. 2009); Mott v. State, 9 A.3d 464, 
467 (Del. 2010).  
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perjury or other corrupt means.”30  Unable to overcome the presumption of probable 
cause that attached to the validly issued indictment and arrest warrant, Scheing has failed 
to state a claim of malicious prosecution against Fountain.         
III.  
 For the above reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.31 
                                              
30 Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 353 (3d Cir. 1989); see Goodwin v. Conway, 836 F.3d 
321, 329 (3d Cir. 2016); Camiolo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 334 F.3d 345, 363 (3d 
Cir. 2003); Trabal v. Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp., 269 F.3d 243, 251 (3d Cir. 
2001).  
31 In light of this conclusion, we need not address the defendants’ alternative argument 
that they are entitled to qualified immunity.   
